Space is the final frontier, it is also a revolving door in Chinese politics these days. Of the 205 full members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 20th Central Committee (CC), ten are aerospace industry veterans, some of whom ran major projects like the Chang’e Lunar Program.
Pride over China’s successful space program is effusive in official media. With intensifying technology competition between China and the United States, Beijing can easily tout tangible products like trains, rockets, commercial jets, and its space station as “wins” for technological self-sufficiency.
Such emphasis on technology self-sufficiency is not only manifest in the rise of this “aerospace cabal.” It is also reflected in the broader resurgence of technocrats in the top echelon of Chinese politics, as our previous analysis highlighted.
The numbers make clear that technocrats did quite well in getting promoted or retaining their seats in the 20th Party Congress political transition. Of the 205 full members of the 20th CC, more than a third (69) are STEM technocrats, a 35% increase from the 19th CC. Even at the Politburo level, 8 of the 24 members are technocrats, a doubling from the 19th Politburo.
Among this cohort of technocrats is a notable provincial bias: the majority are running provinces instead of central ministries. In fact, 36 technocrats in the 20th CC are leading provinces, compared to just 20 in the 19th CC (see Figure 1). The logic here seems to be that placing leaders with technical expertise, instead of your average politician, in provincial roles will improve the odds of ameliorating technological deficiencies vital to China’s national security.
To read the full analysis please click here.
Our thanks to the team at Macro Polo for sharing these insights.
