China Direct

Meet Thailand's Energy Players - Future Energy Asia 17-19 May 2023

About this event:

Date: 17th - 19th May 2023

Location: Bangkok, Thailand

Future Energy Asia is Global energy transition event, providing a business platform that brings together Asia's natural gas, LNG, renewable and power generation industries to identify solutions and strategies to foster a secure, affordable and low-carbon energy mix for the continent. With 8,000+ energy professionals expected to attend over the 3 days, you can be certain of the business to be conducted at the event. Future Energy Asia Exhibition & Conference is the perfect platform for companies to showcase their expertise and brands to investors looking to do business in an ever-changing dynamic Asian energy market.

By joining the EIC APAC Business Lounge, you'll have access to meeting areas and exhibitor pods where you can showcase your offerings and capitalize on the tremendous potential of this region. Don't miss this opportunity to be a part of the exciting developments happening in the Thailand energy sector, join the EIC APAC Business Lounge today.

If you wish to exhibit with us and participate at the event, feel free to contact our event coordinator at daniel.ryan@the-eic.com

Our thanks to the UKABC and The EIC for kindly sharing this event information.

Deny Detect Defer: Countering China's economic coercion

As China has grown economically, so too has its propensity to engage in acts of economic coercion against both its neighbors and more distant countries. This report analyzes eight cases of Chinese economic coercion since 2010—against Japan, Norway, the Philippines, Mongolia, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and Lithuania—and reveals that the most salient characteristic of China’s economic coercion is that it simply is not very effective. While problematic, China’s economic coercion should be viewed with a sense of perspective; indeed, Beijing’s behavior provides an opportunity to advance U.S. interests in multiple ways.

This report proposes a counterstrategy based on the logic of deterrence by denial that has two mutually reinforcing components: preemptive “denial” policies that aim to harden vulnerable economies against Chinese economic coercion, and reactive “deflection” policies that aim to negate China’s coercion by providing targeted relief to accelerate market adjustments, minimizing the political and economic pressure China can impose on the target. The counterstrategy proposed here aims to deter Beijing from its disruptive behavior over time, while preserving the moral high ground for the United States.

This report is made possible through the generous support of the Smith Richardson Foundation. The crisis simulation was made possible by the generous support of the Australian government. 

To download the full report please click here.

Our sincere thanks to CSIS and the Smith Richardson Foundation for preparing this report.

MERICS - Special Issue - National People's Congress Digest

NPC confirms a government steeled for competition with the US

This year’s National People’s Congress (NPC) set the points for more open great power competition with the United States as it confirmed Xi Jinping for a third term as President of the People’s Republic of China. Having spent a decade shoring up his hegemony over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Party’s over the country, Xi had the NPC rubber-stamp personnel choices and adjustments to the party-state structure so that China can reduce dependencies on other countries and better assert itself internationally.

It was a tacit admission that China now takes as given friction with the US – over global power and influence as well as security concerns in military and non-military areas like energy – and the need for a new balance between globalized supply chains and less dependency on other countries in critical technologies.

Installing new top government officials that support and have the skills to implement his agenda, Xi completed the personnel reshuffle he had begun at the 20th Party Congress last fall. The world will now watch to see whether Xi gives trusted lieutenants any freedom to set their own priorities. 

Premier Li Qiang, a Xi loyalist, used his first speech in his new office to voice business-friendly sentiments, warn against overhyping US-Chinese decoupling, and signal a shift to “high-quality development” (as opposed to high-speed growth) and strong support for science and technology. Optimists say Xi will give him room to maneuver, while skeptics see Li as business-friendly cover for a president intent on prioritizing politics and ideology over the economy. 

All leadership posts in the central CCP and state leadership are now filled by people Xi trusts, including one solitary woman, Shen Yiqin, who was made a State Councilor in China’s cabinet. The appointments further integrate state office with the Xi-dominated CCP: Leading state officials are party cadres first and only Premier, a State Councilors, the chairman of the NPC and so on after that. 

MERICS analysis: “For Xi, the NPC marked the beginning of a new five-year term in which he holds all the reigns – he controls the agenda, key people and institutions,” says Nis Grünberg, MERICS Lead Analyst. “Xi is adamant about making China strong and globally influential again. But his third term will be defined by the tension between this vision, and the determination of the US to keep China from rising to become a global peer.“

Media coverage and sources:

• NPC Observer: A Guide to China’s 2023 State Council Restructuring 
• Reuters: Factbox: Key takeaways from China's annual NPC parliamentary meeting
• Xinhua: List of key officials of China's State Council-Xinhua 

METRIX

48,600,000,000

This is the number of terabytes of data China will generate by 2025, according to a study by the International Data Corporation and Seagate. To better manage these billions of terabytes (or 48.6 zettabytes) of information that constitute the country's data market, the NPC rubber-stamped the creation of the National Data Administration under the authority of the National Development and Reform Commission. The new body is meant to spur the digital economy as well as digital government and public services by promoting the opening-up, sharing and utilization of data resources. (Source: CNBC)

 

Topics

MERICS Top 6: Institutional restructuring announced at the NPC

In addition to the personnel decisions, this year’s congress announced the “State Council Institutional Reform Plan” (国务院机构改革方案). It foresees the following major changes:

1. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is shedding a number of non-core units “to further streamline leadership and management of China’s science and technology system”, as the reform plan says. For example, the China Rural Technology Center will become part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. At the same time, MOST will take charge of day-to-day management of the newly established Central Science and Technology Commission tasked with coordinating national science and technology development (see story below). 
2. The National Financial Regulatory Administration is the new financial regulator. Directly under the State Council, the administration will replace the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission as the country’s central regulator of banks and insurers, although it will not have oversight over securities.
3. The China Securities Regulatory Commission will be upgraded from a public service organ to a fully-fledged administration under the State Council, giving it more direct power. The step is meant to ensure more streamlined decision-making in creating and enforcing rules that govern the securities industry.  
4. The founding of the National Data Administration is an important step towards building a more data-driven economy. China wants to centralize what is currently a fragmented and patchworked system. Under the auspices of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s main economic-planning institution, the new unit is meant to “coordinate and promote the development of basic data systems” and “coordinate the integrated sharing, development, and use of data resources”. The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) will remain in charge of safeguarding data protection and security. 
5. The China National Intellectual Property Administration has been elevated to become an agency directly under the control of the State Council (instead of the State Administration for Market Regulation).  The upgrade in administrative rank is meant to give the unit more power to craft and implement regulation. 
6. The National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration is moved from the purview of the General Office of the State Council to being an organization directly under the control of the State Council. It will be interesting to see how open for input from the public the new government will prove to be.

Legislation: NPC ties law-making more closely to CCP agenda, legislation law

Aside from a number of administrative reforms, the NPC revised China’s Legislation Law, which regulates the country’s lawmaking and review powers. The changes are part of Xi’s efforts to expand and modernize China’s legal code in step with the country’s fast-paced social, economic and technological development. The revision introduces some practical steps to speed up legislation and ensure the coherence of China’s quickly growing body of laws and regulations. But amendments also tie law-making at central and local levels of government even more closely to the CCP’s political agenda. 

Some of the revisions foster a more standardized development of China’s legal code:

• The mandate of the Constitution and Law Committee of the NPC to assess the constitutionality and legality of new and existing legislation has been broadened. To avoid conflicting norms, potential issues should be considered early on and throughout the law-making process. 
• Municipal-level legislatures have been given a more narrowly defined task list to help promote “high quality development”. They are meant to focus on issues like grassroots social governance, and environmental affairs. The move partially reigns in local law-making powers which were expanded in 2015. 

But other amendments also increase political flexibility and allow quick responses where the leadership deems necessary:

• The NPC Standing Committee has been granted new emergency lawmaking powers which allow the 175-member permanent assembly to adopt a bill after a single deliberation (and no longer a minimum of two rounds). 
• The NPC and its Standing Committee have been given expanded powers to exempt certain pilot projects and regions from compliance with existing laws for “a certain time and scope”, to grant policymakers room for experimentation and reform. 
• The State Supervision Commission, part of the CCP’s anti-corruption and watchdog, has been granted new rights to make regulation. The body and will certainly use it to enforce political discipline in party and state ranks. 

MERICS analysis: “The new emphasis on constitutionality and legality signals greater attention on the standardization of lawmaking. But it also boosts the CCP’s claim to set the legislative agenda,” says MERICS expert Katja Drinhausen. “The 2018 constitutional amendments made party leadership the overriding principle. Hence, implementing the will of the party is constitutional. The new article 8 of the Legislation Law requires that all legislation “advocate the socialist core values”.

Media coverage and sources:

• Reuters: China's parliament approves changes to speed up 'emergency' laws
• NPC Observer: NPC 2023: Proposed Amendments to China’s “Statutory Constitution” of Lawmaking 

Economy: NPC messaging pushes business confidence but also sets boundaries

The tone on China’s economic agenda was decidedly soft and pro-business throughout the Two Sessions. Notably, the recently confirmed new premier, Li Qiang, gave an upbeat press conference to foreign and local reporters, expressing confidence that China can handle current challenges and that the private sector can expect strong support and a level playing field. 

Institutional reforms on the economic side saw some strengthening of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the economy’s central planner, and a significant reshuffling of financial institutions. But even that was softened by the unexpected continuation of the current leaders of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the Ministry of Finance who have been comparatively pro-business and non-ideological in previous years. 

This pro-business signaling cannot be divorced from the broader context. The elevation of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) centers technological self-reliance in the party state’s agenda, which was echoed throughout the event in comments from top leaders. This sends a clear signal for what top leadership want – to close the tech gap with the US and others. 

Xi made this very clear in a meeting of Jiangsu delegates: he interrupted a delegate who runs the Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group to ask if the chips in the company’s cranes all were made domestically. Similarly, Xi also reminded everyone of the importance of civil-military fusion in remarks to delegates of the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police. 

MERICS analysis: “Beijing will make space for the private sector to play its role in development and growth, but firms must also play their role in helping achieve tech self-reliance,” said MERICS Senior Analyst Jacob Gunter. “That’s still a somewhat toned-down message compared to 2020-2022, when the private sector took quite a few hits. This softer, yet still firm tone will help boost confidence for now, while the Third Plenum at the end of the year may be where we see more of Xi’s economic ideology come into play.”  

Media coverage and sources:

• SCMP: ‘Are your chips made locally?’ Xi Jinping prods construction vehicle maker about semiconductors amid self-sufficiency push
• Business Insider: Xi Jinping wants China's army to work closely with the country's tech giants, further blurring the lines between the military and civilian sectors
• Shanghai Eye: [FULL] China's new Premier Li Qiang takes questions from the media

Foreign policy: Beijing signals readiness for great power competition

Events at and around this year’s NPC sent three clear messages regarding China’s foreign policy trajectory: one, this is a much more outward-looking Chinese leadership, which means tackling the country’s worsening international environment will be a priority. Two, competition with the United States will continue to shape Beijing’s agenda for the next five years; and three, Beijing wants to make clear that there are alternatives to Washington when it comes to constructive diplomacy on the world stage.

Qin Gang, China’s former ambassador to the US, continued his fast ascent in the machinery of state back at home. The recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs was also made a State Councilor in China’s highest administrative body. While Xi Jinping in an unusually explicit way accused the US of leading Western countries in containing China, Qin warned conflict between the two countries would be inevitable unless the US “hits the brakes” on the “wrongheaded” path it is currently heading down. 

China’s defense and security remain a top priority. The 2023 budget plan outlined a 7.2 percent rise in the military budget for 2023, in line with recent trends and in spite of the country’s current economic difficulties. Li Shangfu was confirmed as defense minister. A general in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Li has been barred from the US since 2018 for his role in buying Russian weapons. His appointment signals Beijing is willing to sacrifice already limited military dialogue if the sanctions remain in place. 

In another move highlighting its push for a bigger international role, Beijing brokered a pact between Iran and Saudi Arabia to reestablish diplomatic ties. The move could help calm tensions in the Middle East. But the timing of the announcement – it came during the NPC – was also a message to the international community: China is a force for peace, and its diplomacy can bring about constructive agreements – unlike that of the US.

MERICS analysis: “The NPC has shown that we can expect China to continue with its assertive diplomatic approach in the face of growing international challenges,” says Helena Legarda, Lead Analyst at MERICS. “Deng Xiaoping’s maxim about China ‘hiding and biding’ has been shelved – the new mantra is ‘struggle’. Regardless of how we may want to call it, ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ does not seem to be going out of style.” 

Media coverage and sources:

• SCMP: Qin Gang named state councilor in latest move marking foreign minister’s rapid rise 
• People’s Daily (CN): 秦刚谈中美关系：希望美方消除战略焦虑 摒弃冷战思维 (Qin Gang on U.S.-China relations: I hope the US side eliminates strategic anxiety and discards Cold War mentality)
• New York Times: Chinese-Brokered Deal Upends Mideast Diplomacy and Challenges U.S.

Innovation: Institutional reshuffle to generate science and tech breakthroughs

China is strengthening the oversight and policy role of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), while passing project administration and funds distribution on to other ministries. A revamped Central Science and Technology Commission under the Communist Party will provide a direct link to the central leadership. MoST will retain responsibility for the largest, most fundamental projects in core sectors like semiconductors, aerospace and new materials. Responsibility for high-tech development zones will go to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), while the respective sectoral bodies will be responsible for agricultural and healthcare research. 

These changes signal a larger role for the MoST in resolving bottlenecks in technology development. The ministry was already reformed five years ago, but Chinese commentators at Caixin, a leading financial online magazine, say more changes were required as global circumstances have shifted profoundly since then. Five years ago, the goal was to become better integrated into global research networks and benefit from international technology transfer. That path now looks increasingly unreliable, they argue. 

The reorganization also reflects growing great power competition and the decoupling of China’s economy with trading partners in the West. Commentators in mainstream investigative media like The Paper call on China to do more early-phase research and, most importantly, tackle bottlenecks with a “whole of nation system”. These reforms are meant to lay the groundwork for this approach. Commentators consistently frame the MoST’s shedding of responsibilities as an upgrade of its role and responsibilities. 

MERICS analysis: “A division of labor may reduce conflicts of interest. However, it is unclear how much this restructuring will help China achieve the breakthroughs in science and technology it wants,” says Antonia Hmaidi, MERICS Analyst. “While it strengthens top-level design in key tech areas, it introduces fragmentation into other parts of the system, such as commercializing research results. For instance, high-tech zones no longer fall under the MoST, even if they have been key to China’s progress in science and technology. A breakthrough in semiconductors, for example, cannot happen in a vacuum, it needs to be commercialized with a robust set of suppliers.” 

Media coverage and sources:

• The Paper (CN): 重组科技部，发挥“新型举国体制”优势 (Re-structuring the MoSt realizes the full advantages of the "new whole-of-nation system“)
• Caixin (CN): 科技部重组，不再参与具体科研项目评审和管理，有何深意？-知识分子的财新博客 (MoST re-structuring, it’s not supposed to do program administration anymore, what does this mean?)
• Sina.com (CN): 两会观察丨成立科技委，重组科技部，科技体制新顶层设计有何深意？科技部|全国两会_新浪科技 (Two sessions: Creating the Central Science and Technology Commission, reorganizing MoST, what does the new top-level design of the science and tech system mean?)

MERICS China Digest

China’s Xi plans to speak with Zelensky for first time since Ukraine war broke out (WSJ)

China’s party and state leader Xi Jinping will be travelling to Moscow to meet with Russian president Vladimir Putin next week and also plans to speak with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the first time since Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, according to media reports. (23/03/13)

1,100 scientists and students barred from UK amid China crackdown (The Guardian) 

The British Guardian reports that more than 1,000 scientists and postgraduate students were barred from working in the UK last year on national security grounds, up from just 128 in 2020. The sharp increase follows a hardening of London’s stance on research collaboration with China. While there was no breakdown by nationality provided, the paper assumes that Chinese academics account for a majority of those denied clearance. (23/03/15)

Germany planning to ban Huawei, ZTE from parts of 5G networks -paper (Reuters) 

Berlin is planning on forbidding telecoms operators from using certain components from Chinese telecom firms Huawei and ZTE in their 5G networks, according to Zeit Online reports from earlier this month. The ban could include components already built into the networks. (23/03/06)

 

Our sincere thanks to MERICS for kindly sharing these invaluable insights.

Making sense of China's government budget - China Power / CSIS

On March 13, 2023, at the annual convening of the government’s “two sessions,” China finalized a new government budget that will play a major role in shaping the trajectory of the world’s second-largest economy. Beijing also released new data on spending in 2022, which provides valuable insights into the country’s evolving spending priorities and its overall fiscal situation. Yet these budgets can be difficult to parse, and the topline figures only tell part of the story. This ChinaPower feature untangles the details behind China’s government budget.

Key Takeaways

• China’s 2023 general public budget projects revenue of RMB 23.6 trillion ($3.4 trillion) and sets spending at RMB 27.5 trillion ($4 trillion), resulting in an official deficit of nearly RMB 3.9 trillion ($564.1 billion).
• China’s official 2023 deficit is pegged at about 3 percent of Chinese GDP, but the full deficit—which accounts for other spending areas—is much larger, at around 7.4 percent of GDP.
• New data on China’s 2022 general public budget shows the government brought in less revenue than previously projected, largely due to declining land sales, which are a critical source of income for local governments.
• China’s zero-Covid policies weighed on Chinese coffers. Spending on health and sanitation rose 17.8 percent in 2022—more than twice the growth rate of any other category.

For full access to this report please click here.

Our thanks to The China Power Project for sharing these insights.

FGS Global Analysis - Two Meetings

Please find CBI Member FGS Global's latest Two meetings Insights in the following paper provided by Daniel Lyons, FGS Global's Beijing Managing Director.

Download FGS Global Insights - China Two Sessions 2023

Our sincere thanks to the FGS Global team for kindly sharing these insights.

China Dialogue - Environmental News Digest 17 March 2023

Dear CBI Members and Partners,

For reports, interviews and insights into a country shaping the world please review China Dialogue directly here.

Download News Digest China Dialogue 17 March 23

With grateful thanks to the team at China Dialogue for so very kindly sharing this content.

A review of the Two Meetings - Brunswick Group

To review the Two Meetings please click here.

Our thanks to Brunswick Group for kindly sharing this timely analysis.

 

A policy agenda for strategic competition with China - CSIS

After much anticipation, the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party held its inaugural hearing on February 28. Chaired by Representative Mike Gallagher (R-WI), the bipartisan committee demonstrated a high degree of top-line consensus on concerns about the power and influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), both here in the United States and around the globe.

Given its exclusive focus on China, it is in a privileged position to move the policy debate onto more prioritized, specific, and, ultimately, impactful terrain. The increasingly negative views of China amongst the American public, shaped in no small part by Beijing’s increasingly illiberal politics at home and aggressive foreign policy abroad, mean that the committee comes into being with a clear mandate and one that it should use to find effective means to improve U.S. national competitiveness and counter those aspects of Beijing’s behavior that run counter to U.S. interests. Even where disagreements occur over China strategy, and they surely do, there are a number of key areas where there is common ground the committee can capitalize on.

Yet, while the consensus is real, there are several points the committee might consider as it looks to future hearings.

Please click here to read the full policy agenda article by Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS.

Our sincere thanks to CSIS for sharing this article,

 

Opinion Piece - Permacrisis can't be the future of US-China Relations - ANU

Permacrisis can’t be the future of US–China relations

13 March 2023

Author: Editorial Board, ANU

Confusion, miscommunication, lies, crude posturing, finger-pointing— last month’s ‘balloongate’ was the contemporary US–China relationship in microcosm.

As Paul Heer writes in the first of this week’s two lead articles, ‘[w]e now know that this rapid sequence of events reflected a rush to judgement and action before the facts were clear’. The balloon’s drift over North America wasn’t the deliberate provocation it was initially cast as — more likely the result of a spy balloon blown off-course — though in doing so it ‘exposed a Chinese intelligence program that would violate international law by operating within other countries’ territorial airspace’.

The peril to US national security from the balloon’s overflight didn’t match the overheated rhetoric. But it was alarming in how it revealed ‘mutual distrust, latent hostility, a failure to communicate and the adverse impact of internal politics on how the two sides deal with each other’, writes Heer, and ‘reinforced their exaggerated assessments of each other’s strategic intentions’.

To read this excellent first article please click here.

Our sincere thanks to the EAF and its Editorial Board located at the Australian National University for kindly sharing these insights.

 

 

China Dialogue - Environmental News Digest 23 Feb 2023

 

Dear CBI Members and Partners,

For reports, interviews and insights into a country shaping the world please review China Dialogue directly here.

Download News digest China Dialogue Feb 23

With grateful thanks to the team at China Dialogue for so very kindly sharing this content.